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ABSTRACT
Mobile communication networks connect much of the world’s pop-
ulation. The security of users’ calls, SMSs, and mobile data depends
on the guarantees provided by the Authenticated Key Exchange
protocols used. For the next-generation network (5G), the 3GPP
group has standardized the 5G AKA protocol for this purpose.
We provide the first comprehensive formal model of a protocol
from the AKA family: 5GAKA.We also extract precise requirements
from the 3GPP standards defining 5G and we identify missing
security goals. Using the security protocol verification tool Tamarin,
we conduct a full, systematic, security evaluation of the model with
respect to the 5G security goals. Our automated analysis identifies
the minimal security assumptions required for each security goal
and we find that some critical security goals are not met, except
under additional assumptions missing from the standard. Finally,
we make explicit recommendations with provably secure fixes for
the attacks and weaknesses we found.
KEYWORDS
5G standard, authentication protocols, AKA protocol, symbolic
verification, formal analysis
1 INTRODUCTION
Two thirds of the world’s population, roughly 5 billion people, are
mobile subscribers [25]. They are connected to the mobile network
via their USIM cards and are protected by security mechanisms
standardized by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)
group. Both subscribers and carriers expect security guarantees
from the mechanisms used, such as the confidentiality of user data
(e.g., voice and SMS) and that subscribers are billed only for the
services they consume. Moreover, these properties should hold in
an adversarial environment with malicious base stations and users.
One of the most important security mechanisms in place aims
at mutually authenticating subscribers and their carriers and es-
tablishing a secure channel to protect subsequent communication.
For network generations (3G and 4G) introduced since the year
2000, this is achieved using variants of the Authentication and Key
Agreement (AKA) protocol, standardized by the 3GPP. These proto-
cols involve the subscribers, the Serving Networks (SNs) that have
base stations in subscribers’ vicinity, and Home Networks (HNs)
that correspond to the subscribers’ carriers. The protocols aim to
enable the subscribers and the HNs to mutually authenticate each
other and to let the subscribers and the SNs establish a session key.
Next-Generation (5G). Since 2016, the 3GPP group has been stan-
dardizing the next generation of mobile communication (5G) with
the aim of increasing network throughput and offering an ambi-
tious infrastructure encompassing new use cases. The 5G standard
will be deployed in two phases. The first phase (Release 15, June
2018) addresses the most critical requirements needed for commer-
cial deployment and forms the basis for the first deployment. The
second phase (Release 16, to be completed by the end of 2019) will
address all remaining requirements.
In June 2018, the 3GPP published the final version v15.1.0 of Re-
lease 15 of the Technical Specification (TS) defining the 5G security
architecture and procedures [4]. The authentication in 5G Release
15 is based on new versions of the AKA protocols, notably the new
5G AKA protocol, which enhances the AKA protocol currently used
in 4G (EPS AKA) and which supposedly provides improved security
guarantees. This raises the following question:What are the security
guarantees that 5G AKA actually provides and under which threat
model and security assumptions?
Formal Methods. In this paper, we give a precise answer to the
above question. Namely, we apply formal methods and automated
verification in the symbolic model to determine precisely which
security guarantees are met by 5G AKA. Formal methods have al-
ready proved extremely valuable in assessing the security of large-
scale, real-world security protocols such as TLS 1.3 [11, 17, 19],
messaging protocols [27], and entity authentication protocols [6].
Symbolic approaches, in particular, allow one to automate reason-
ing using techniques including model-checking, resolution, and
rewriting. Examples of mature verification tools along these lines
are Tamarin [31], ProVerif [12], and DeepSec [15].
Unfortunately, the AKA protocols, and a fortiori 5G AKA, feature
a combination of properties that are extremely challenging for
state-of-the-art verification techniques and tools and, until very
recently, a detailed formalization was outside of their scope. First,
the flow and the state-machines of these protocols are large and
complex. This is due in part to the use of sequence numbers (SQN)
and the need for a re-synchronization mechanism should counters
become out-of-sync. This complexity is problematic for tools that
reason about a bounded number of sessions as they scale poorly
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here. It also eliminates the option of machine-checked manual
proofs as the number of interactions is too large for humans to
explore. Second, these protocols are stateful (the SQN counters are
mutable and persist over multiple sessions) and have numerous
loops. This makes inductive reasoning necessary and rules out
fully automated tools, which are not yet capable of automatically
finding appropriate inductive invariants. Finally, the AKA protocols
use the Exclusive-OR (XOR) primitive to conceal some values. This
primitive is notoriously hard to reason about symbolically, due to its
algebraic properties (i.e., associativity, commutativity, cancellation,
and neutral element). For this reason, prior works provided only
limited models of the AKA protocols, which were insufficiently
precise for a satisfactory analysis; see the discussion on related
work below. Given these features, we are left with just the verifier
Tamarin [31] as a suitable tool, and Tamarin has only recently
been extended to handle XOR [22].
Contributions. We describe next our three main contributions:
our formalization, models, and analysis results.
Formalization of the 5G Standard. We extract and formally inter-
pret the standard’s security assumptions and goals. In doing so, we
identify key missing security goals and flaws in the stated goals. We
target a wide range of properties — confidentiality, authentication,
and privacy — and their fine-grained variants. As explained in Sec-
tions 2 and 3, this required considerable analysis and interpretation
of the 3GPP Technical Specification (722 pages across 4 documents).
Formal Model of 5G AKA. We tackle the aforementioned chal-
lenges to provide the first faithful model of an AKA protocol that is
detailed enough for a precise security analysis and is still amenable
to automation. As we explain in Section 4, the modeling choices
for formalizing our interpretation of the standard are crucial. To
support reasoning about our model, we develop dedicated proof
techniques based on inductive lemmas and proof strategies that
guide proof search.
Security Evaluation of 5G AKA. We carry out the first formal se-
curity evaluation of 5G authentication, providing a comprehensive
analysis of the 5G AKA protocol. This includes:
• a formal, systematic security evaluation: we leverage our
model of 5G AKA to automatically identify the minimal secu-
rity assumptions required for each security goal to hold. We
find that some critical authentication properties are violated
prior to key confirmation, which is not clearly mandated by
the standard. Some other properties are not met, except un-
der assumptions on the 5G ecosystem that are missing from
the standard. Additionally, we show that a privacy attack
(enabling traceability) is possible for an active attacker. See
the tables in Section 5.2 for details.
• recommendations: we make explicit recommendations and
propose provably secure fixes for the attacks and weaknesses
we identified. Most of our recommendations generalize to
5G Authentication as a whole, and not just 5G AKA.
We believe that our model of 5G AKA provides a valuable tool to
accompany the 5G standard’s evolution and assess the security
of future proposal updates and the standard’s evolution (e.g., 5G
phase 2). Our model can also serve as the basis for a comprehensive
formal comparison between AKA protocols from all generations,
providing precise answers to questions like “what guarantees does
one obtain, or lose, when moving from 4G to 5G?”
Related Work. Formal methods have been applied to AKA pro-
tocols in the past, but prior work provided only weak guarantees
due to the use of strong abstractions, protocol simplifications, and
limitations in the analyzed properties.
The initial AKA protocol specified for 3G was manually verified
by the 3GPP using TLA and an enhanced BAN logic [3]. The TLA
analysis focused on functional properties, like the protocol recovers
from de-synchronization. The short pen and paper proof, which
was given in an enhanced BAN logic, provides weak guarantees,
e.g., about key agreement and confidentiality, due to the logic’s
limitations. In particular, the logic does not account for, e.g., com-
promised agents and type-flaws, and it has had soundness issues
in the past [14]. Moreover, the proof considered a simplified proto-
col without SQN concealment or re-synchronization as SQNs were
always assumed to be synchronized. This misses, for example, the
privacy attack based on the desynchronization error message that
we observed.
ProVerif has also been used to formally check untraceabil-
ity and basic authentication properties of simplified AKA proto-
cols [5, 32]. These prior works acknowledge the challenges of for-
mally verifying AKA protocols but only offered limited solutions.
For instance, the SQN counters were abstracted away by nonces
that are initially shared by HNs and subscribers, thus reducing the
protocol to a stateless protocol. The re-synchronization procedure
was also omitted. The SNs and HNs were merged into a single entity.
Furthermore, XOR was either not modeled or was replaced by a
different construct with simpler algebraic properties. The resulting
protocol was thus overly simplified and corresponding analyses
would have missed the attacks we obtain in this paper (Table 1).
Moreover, the only authentication property that was checked is
mutual aliveness between subscribers and the network.
More recently, [26] proposed a model-based testing approach
that used ProVerif to carry out some analyses of EPS AKA from 4G.
However, in addition to using the same aforementioned abstractions
and simplifications, they only used ProVerif to check if specific
trace executions correspond to attack traces.
In summary, in stark contrast to previous work, we provide the
first faithful formalization of an AKA protocol. Namely, we for-
malize the entire protocol logic including the full protocol state
machine with all message flows and symbolic abstractions of all
cryptographic operators. This allows for the first comprehensive
formal analysis that characterizes the properties that are achieved
in different adversarial settings.
Outline.We present in Section 2 the cellular network architecture
and how authentication is achieved in the 5G ecosystem using
the 5G AKA protocol. We carry out a systematic formalization of
the security assumptions and goals of the standard in Section 3
and highlight shortcomings. In Section 4 we explain the basics of
the Tamarin verifier and our modeling and design choices. We
present our comprehensive security analysis of 5G AKA and our
recommendations in Section 5. We draw conclusions in Section 6.
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2 5G AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS
We explain in this section how authentication and key establish-
ment are achieved in the 5G ecosystem, following as closely as pos-
sible the specification 3GPP TS 33.501 [4], referred from here on as
[TS 33.501]. We simplify terminology to improve readability and
refer the knowledgeable reader to the correspondence table with the
terminology from 3GPP given in Appendix A. We first present the
general architecture and afterwards the authentication protocols.
2.1 Architecture
Three main entities are involved in the cellular network architec-
ture (see Figure 1). First, User Equipment (UE), typically smart-
phones or IoT devices containing a Universal Subscriber Identity
Module (USIM), are carried by subscribers. We shall call a subscriber
the combination of a UE with its USIM. Second, Home Networks
(HNs) contain a database of their subscribers and are responsible
for their authentication. However, subscribers may be in locations
where their corresponding HN has no base station (i.e., antennas
which may connect UEs to the network), for example when roaming.
Therefore, the architecture has a third entity: the Serving Networks
(SNs) to which UEs may attach to. An SN provides services (e.g.,
call or SMS) once both the UE and the SN have mutually authen-
ticated each other (this supports billing) and have established a
secure channel with the help of the subscriber’s HN . The UE and
SN communicate over the air, while the SN and HN communicate
over an authenticated channel (we list security assumptions later
in this section).
As mentioned earlier, each subscriber has a USIM with crypto-
graphic capabilities (e.g., symmetric encryption, MAC). Relevant
for our work is that the USIM stores:
• a unique and permanent subscriber identity, called the Sub-
scription Permanent Identifier (SUPI ),
• the public asymmetric key pkHN of its corresponding HN ,
• a long-term symmetric key, denoted as K (used as a shared
secret between subscribers and their corresponding HNs),
and
• a counter, called Sequence Number, denoted as SQN.
The HN , associated to some subscriber, stores the same information
in its database.
Simplifications. In the standard, SNs and HNs are composed of
several sub-entities (e.g., HNs consist of a database, authentication
server, etc.). However, very few security properties require this level
Subscriber
Phone (UE), USIM
Serving Network
Base station (antenna)
Home Network
Subscriber’s carrier
Figure 1: Overall architecture: The subscriber uses his
phone (UE), equipped with a USIM, to communicate with a
base station run by the SN over an insecurewireless channel.
The SN communicates with the subscriber’s carrier (HN ) on
the right over an authenticated (wired) channel.
of granularity. We thus have chosen to consider these three larger
logical entities (see Appendix A for more details).
2.2 Authentication Protocols
To enable SNs and subscribers to establish secure channels and
authenticate each other, the 3GPP has specified two authentica-
tion methods: 5G AKA and EAP-AKA’. The choice between those
two methods is left to the HN , once it has correctly identified the
subscriber with the Initialization Protocol. We now describe these
three security protocols. (All cryptographic messages are precisely
described in Appendix A.)
2.2.1 Initialization Protocol [TS 33.501, Sec. 6.1.2]. Figure 2 de-
picts the sub-protocol responsible for the subscribers’ identification
and initializing the authentication. Once the SN has triggered an
authentication with the subscriber, the latter sends a randomized
encryption of the SUPI (for privacy reasons, as we explain in Sec-
tion 3.2.3): SUCI = ⟨aenc(⟨SUPI,Rs ⟩,pkHN), idHN⟩, where aenc(·)
denotes asymmetric encryption, Rs is a random nonce, and idHN
uniquely identifies an HN . The identifier idHN enables the SN to
request authentication material from the appropriate HN . Upon
reception of the SUCI along with the SN ’s identity (referred to as
SNname), the HN can retrieve the SUPI , the subscribers’ identity,
and choose an authentication method. Note that SUPI also contains
idHN and therefore identifies both a subscriber and its HN .
2.2.2 The 5G AKA Protocol [TS 33.501, Sec. 6.1.3.2]. As mentioned
before, the key K is used as a long-term shared secret, and SQN
provides replay protection1 for the subscriber. While SQN should
be synchronized between the subscriber and the HN , it may happen
that they become out-of-sync, e.g., due to message loss. We thus use
SQNUE (respectively SQNHN) to refer to the SQN value stored in the
UE (respectively HN ). The 5G-AKA protocol consists of two main
phases: a challenge-response and an optional re-synchronization
procedure (that updates the SQN on the HN side in case the SQN
is out of-sync). The entire 5G AKA protocol flow is depicted in
Figure 3.
Challenge-Response. Upon receiving a request for authentication
material, the HN computes an authentication challenge built from:
• a random nonce R (the challenge),
• AUTN (proving the challenge’s freshness and authenticity),
• HXRES∗ (response to the challenge that SN expects),
• KSEAF (key seed for the secure channel that the subscriber
and SN will eventually establish).
The functions f1 − f5, used to compute the authentication param-
eters, are one-way keyed cryptographic functions completely un-
related with each other, and ⊕ denotes Exclusive-OR. Challenge(·)
and KeySeed(·) are complex Key Derivation Functions (KDFs); see
Appendix A for more details. AUTN contains a Message Authentica-
tion Code (MAC) of the concatenation of R with the corresponding
sequence number SQNHN stored for this subscriber. A new sequence
number is generated by incrementing the counter. The sequence
number SQNHN allows the subscriber to verify the freshness of
the authentication request to defend against replay attacks and the
1This design choice is for historical reasons: old USIMs (e.g., in 3G and 4G) did not
have the capability to generate random nonces.
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Subscriber
K, SUPI,
SQNUE, SNname
Serving Network
SNname
Home Network
K, SUPI,
SQNHN
Serving Network has initiated an authentication with the UE
SUCI SUCI, SNname
Get SUPI from SUCI
Choose authentication method
Figure 2: Initiation of Authentication
MAC proves the challenge’s authenticity. The HN does not send the
challenge’s full response RES∗ to the SN but only a hash therereof;
the rationale being that HNs are willing to have assurance of the
presence of its subscribers even with malicious SNs.
The SN stores KSEAF and the challenge’s expected response and
then forwards the challenge to the subscriber. Upon receiving the
challenge, the subscriber first checks its authenticity and freshness.
To do this, the subscriber extracts xSQNHN andMAC from AUTN
and checks that:
(i) MAC is a correct MAC value with respect to K , and replies
’Mac_failure’ if it is not the case,
(ii) the authentication request is fresh2, i.e., SQNUE < xSQNHN,
and replies ⟨’Sync_failure’,AUTS⟩ otherwise (AUTS is
explained in the re-synchronization procedure below).
If all checks hold, then the subscriber computes the key seed KSEAF,
which is used to secure subsequent messages. It also computes the
authentication response RES∗ and sends it to the SN . The SN checks
that this response is as expected and forwards it to the HN , who
validates it. If this validation succeeds then the HN confirms to
the SN that the authentication is successful and sends the SUPI
to the SN . Subsequent communications between the SN and the
subscriber can be secured using the key seed KSEAF.
Re-synchronization procedure [TS 33.501, Sec. 6.1.3.2.1]. In case of a
synchronization failure (case ¬(ii)), the subscriber replies with
⟨’Sync_failure’,AUTS⟩. TheAUTSmessage enables theHN to re-
synchronize with the subscriber by replacing its own SQNHN by the
sequence number of the subscriber SQNUE;
see [TS 33.102, Sec. 6.3.5,6.3.3]. However, SQNUE is not transmitted
in clear text to avoid being eavesdropped on (it is privacy sen-
sitive as explained in Section 3.2.3). Therefore, the specification
requires SQN to be concealed; namely, it is XORed with a value that
should remain private: AK∗ = f5∗(K ,R). Formally, the concealed
value is CONC∗ = SQNUE ⊕ AK∗, which allows the HN to extract
SQNUE by computing AK∗. Note that f5∗ and f1∗ are independent
one-way keyed cryptographic functions, completely unrelated to
the functions f1 − f5. Finally, AUTS = ⟨CONC∗,MAC∗⟩, where
MAC∗ = f1∗(K , ⟨SQNUE,R⟩), allowing the HN to authenticate this
message as coming from the intended subscriber.
2.2.3 The EAP-AKA’ Protocol [TS 33.501, Sec. 6.1.3.1] and [RFC
5448]. EAP-AKA’ is very similar to 5G AKA: it relies on the same
mechanisms (challenge-response withK as a shared secret and SQN
for replay protection) and uses similar cryptographic messages.
2The freshness check may also consider non-normative protection against the wrap-
ping around of SQNHN which we do not describe here; see [TS 33.102, Sec. C].
The main difference is the flow and some key derivation functions
are slightly changed. Since we focus our analysis on the 5G AKA
authentication method, we do not describe those differences in
detail here and refer the curious reader to Appendix B.
3 THREAT MODEL AND SECURITY GOALS
In this section, we derive precise, formal security goals from the
informal descriptions given in the Technical Specification (TS) and
Technical Requirement (TR) documents issued by the 3GPP. Our
formal definitions are our interpretation of these texts. We support
them with quotes from and references to relevant excerpts of the
TS and TR documents. The full list of relevant excerpts along with
explanations of our interpretations is given in Appendix D.
The extraction of precise properties from the standard’s infor-
mally stated goals is an important prerequisite to applying a security
protocol analysis tool (like Tamarin). It is thus a crucial step in the
security analysis of a complex protocol such as 5G AKA.
3.1 Security Assumptions and Threat Model
3.1.1 Assumptions on Channels. The channel between the SN and
the HN provides confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and replay
protection [TS 33.501, Sec. 5.9.3].
The channel between the subscribers and SNs is subject to eaves-
dropping by passive attackers and manipulation, interception, and
injection of messages by active attackers. A passive attacker listens
to signaling messages (i.e.,messages sent on the physical layer) and
can thus eavesdrop on all messages exchanged in its vicinity, but it
never emits a signal. An active attacker sets up a fake base station
to send and receive signaling messages, e.g., to impersonate SNs.
While no 5G-specific hardware is publicly available yet, we recall
that 4G base stations have been built using open-source and freely
available software and hardware [24, 36]. From now on, we shall
consider active attackers, except when explicitly stated otherwise.
3.1.2 Assumptions on Cryptographic Primitives. The functions f1,
f1∗, and f2 are message authentication functions, and f3, f4, f5, f5∗
are key derivation functions [TS 33.102, Sec. 3.2,6.3.2]. To our knowl-
edge there is no comprehensive set of standardized security require-
ments for these functions. The requirements in [TS 33.105, Sec. 5]
are insufficient, but we infer from the informal presentation in
[TS 33.102, Sec. 3.2] and requirements in [TS 33.105, Sec. 5] that
the former provide only integrity protection and the latter both in-
tegrity and confidentiality protection. However, since f1 and f1∗ are
applied to data that should be secret, such as SQN (see Section 3.2.3),
it is our understanding that they should also preserve the confiden-
tiality of their inputs. We therefore assume in our analysis that all
4
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Subscriber
K, SUPI,
SQNUE, SNname
Serving Network
SNname, SUCI
Home Network
K, SUPI,
SQNHN, SNname
new random R
MAC ← f1(K, ⟨SQNHN, R ⟩)
AK ← f5(K, R)
CONC ← SQNHN ⊕ AK
AUTN ← ⟨CONC, MAC⟩
xRES∗ ← Challenge(K, R, SNname)
HXRES∗ ← SHA256(⟨R, xRES∗ ⟩)
KSEAF ← KeySeed(K, R, SQNHN, SNname)
SQNHN ← SQNHN + 1
R, AUTN, HXRES∗, KSEAFR, AUTN
⟨xCONC, xMAC⟩ ← AUTN
AK ← f5(K, R)
xSQNHN ← AK ⊕ xCONC
MAC ← f1(K, ⟨SQNHN, R ⟩)
CHECK (i) xMAC = MAC and
(ii) SQNUE < xSQNHN
SQNUE ← xSQNHN
RES∗ ← Challenge(K, R, SNname)
KSEAF ← KeySeed(K, R, SQNHN, SNname)
RES∗
if SHA256(⟨R, RES∗ ⟩) , HXRES∗then abort
RES∗, SUCI
if RES∗ , XRES∗ then abort
SUPI
Successful Authentication
If (i) and (ii) (Expected Response)
MACS ← f1∗(K, ⟨SQNUE, R ⟩)
AK∗ ← f5∗(K, R)
CONC∗ ← SQNUE ⊕ AK∗
AUTS ← ⟨CONC∗, MAC∗ ⟩
’Sync_Failure’, AUTS ’Sync_Failure’, AUTS, R, SUCI
if CHECK(i) holds for MACS in AUTS
then SQNHN ← SQNUE + 1
If (i) and ¬(ii) (Synchronization Failure)
’Mac_Failure’If ¬(i) (MAC Failure)
Figure 3: The 5G AKA protocol (continuing Figure 2)
these functions protect both integrity and confidentiality, but we
stress that this is either underspecified or subscribers’ privacy is
put at risk (see Section 3.2.3).
3.1.3 Assumptions on Parties. To provide strong, fine-grained guar-
antees, we consider different compromise scenarios. First, we con-
sider an attacker who can compromise some SNs. This means that
the attacker gets access to an authenticated channel between the
compromised SN and HNs, which he can use to eavesdrop on and
inject messages. This is a reasonable assumption in 5G, where au-
thentication methods should provide security guarantees even in
the presence of genuine but malicious SNs [TS 33.501, Sec. 6.1.4.1].
In such situations, the HNs may cooperate with such SNs to authen-
ticate some subscriber. In practice, this may happen in roaming
situations. Next, we consider that the attacker may have genuine
USIMs and compromised USIMs under its control. For those com-
promised subscribers, the attacker can access all secret values stored
in the USIMs; i.e., SUPI, K , and SQN. Finally, the attacker can access
all long-term secrets, K , skHN, and SUPI, from compromised HNs.
5
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3.1.4 Assumptions on Data Protection. The subscriber credentials,
notably the key K and the identifier SUPI, shared between sub-
scribers and HNs, should initially be secret, provided they belong
to non-compromised agents [TS 33.501, Sec. 3.1].
The sequence number SQN is a 48-bit counter or a 43-bit counter
[TS 33.102, Sec. 6.3.7,C.3.2] and therefore guessable with a very low
probability. Note that an offline guessing attack on the sequence
number counter is not possible, and online attacks on the UE first
require a correct MAC (based on the shared secret K) before the
UE responds whether the SQN was acceptable. We thus consider a
reasonable threat model where the value of SQN is unknown to the
attacker when the attack starts, but the attacker knows how it is
incremented during the attack. This corresponds to an attacker who
(i) can monitor the activity of targeted subscribers in its vicinity
during the attack but (ii) can neither guess the initial value of SQN
(iii) nor can he monitor targeted subscribers all the time (i.e., from
their first use of the USIM up to the attack time).
While not explicitly stated in the specification, we shall assume
that the private asymmetric key skHN is initially secret.
3.2 Security Requirements
We now extract and interpret from the 5G documents the security
goals that 5G AKA should achieve according to the 5G standard.
3.2.1 Authentication Properties. The 5G specifications make claims
about authentication properties at different places in the documents.
We have identified relevant claims and translated them into formal
security goals, indicated in purple, cursive text . We use Lowe’s tax-
onomy of authentication properties [29] to make the goals precise,
prior to formalization. These properties are well established and
understood, avoiding ambiguity [7]. Moreover, there is a formal
relationship between the taxonomy and mathematical definitions
of security properties that can be directly modeled in Tamarin [1].
We give an overview of Lowe’s taxonomy and its relationship
with formal definitions of authenticity in Appendix C. Intuitively,
the taxonomy specifies, from an agent A’s point of view, four levels
of authentication between two agents A and B: (i) aliveness, which
only ensures that B has been running the protocol previously, but
not necessarily with A; (ii) weak agreement, which ensures that B
has previously been running the protocol withA, but not necessarily
with the same data; (iii) non-injective agreement, which ensures
that B has been running the protocol with A and both agree on the
data; and (iv) injective agreement, which additionally ensures that
for each run of the protocol of an agent there is a unique matching
run of the other agent, and prevents replay attacks.
Note that the 5G specification considers some authentication
properties to be implicit. This means that the guarantee is provided
only after an additional key confirmation roundtrip (with respect
to KSEAF) between the subscribers and the SN . We discuss the
resulting problems and critique this design choice in Section 5.2.2.
Authentication between subscribers andHNs. First, the subscribers
must have the assurance that authentication can only be successful
with SNs authorized by their HNs; see [TS 33.501, Sec. 6.1.1.3] and:
[TS 33.501, Sec. 5.1.2] Serving network authorization by the
home network: Assurance [that the subscriber] is connected to a
serving network that is authorized by the home network. [...] This
authorization is ‘implicit’ in the sense that it is implied by a successful
authentication and key agreement run.
Formally, a subscribermust obtain non-injective agreement on SNname
with its HN after key confirmation.
In 5G, the trust assumptions are different than in previous stan-
dards, like 3G or 4G. Most notably, the level of trust the system
needs to put into the SNs has been reduced. One important property
provided by 5G is that an SN can no longer fake authentication
requests with the HNs for subscribers not attached to one of its base
stations [TS 33.501, Sec. 6.1.4.1]. Formally, the HNs obtain the alive-
ness of its subscribers at that SN, which is non-injective agreement
on SNname from the HNs’ point of view with the subscribers.
Authentication between subscribers and SNs. As expected, the SNs
shall be able to authenticate the subscribers:
[TS 33.501, Sec. 5.1.2] Subscription authentication: The serv-
ing network shall authenticate the Subscription Permanent Identifier
(SUPI) in the process of authentication and key agreement between
UE and network.
Formally, the SNs must obtain non-injective agreement on SUPI with
the subscribers. As SUPI is the subscriber’s identifier this is actually
just weak agreement for the SNs with the subscribers. Moreover,
since SUPI also contains idHN, an agreement on SUPI entails an
agreement on idHN.
Conversely, the subscribers shall be able to authenticate the SNs:
[TS 33.501, Sec. 5.1.2] Serving network authentication: The
UE shall authenticate the serving network identifier through implicit
key authentication.
Since SNname is the SN ’s identifier, the subscribers must obtain
weak agreement with the SNs after key confirmation.
Authentication between SNs and HNs. The SNs shall be able to
authenticate subscribers that are authorized by their corresponding
HN :
[TS 33.501, Sec. 5.1.2] UE authorization: The serving network
shall authorize the UE through the subscription profile obtained from
the home network. UE authorization is based on the authenticated
SUPI.
The SNs must obtain non-injective agreement on SUPI with the HNs.
3.2.2 Confidentiality Properties. While it is not clearly specified,
obviously 5G-AKA should ensure the secrecy of KSEAF, K , and skHN
(see similar goals in 3G [TS 133.102, Sec. 5.1.3]).
5G-AKA should also ensure that knowledge of the session key
KSEAF established in one session is insufficient to deduce another
session key K ′SEAF established in either a previous session or a later
session [TS 33.501, Sec. 3]. Formally, the key KSEAF established in
a given session remains confidential even when the attacker learns
the KSEAF keys established in all other sessions. Note that this is
different from forward secrecy and post-compromise secrecy [16],
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which fail to hold as we shall see in Section 5.1. Forward and post-
compromise secrecy require session key secrecy even when long-
term key material is compromised. 5G-AKA does not meet these
requirements as knowledge of the keyK allows an attacker to derive
all past and future keys.
Finally, the same key KSEAF should never be established twice
[TS 133.102, Sec. 6.2.3]. This will be analyzed as part of Injective
agreement properties on the established key KSEAF for different pairs
of parties.
3.2.3 Privacy Properties. We first emphasize the importance given
to privacy in 5G documentation:
[TR 33.899, Sec. 4.1,4.2] Subscription privacy deals with various
aspects related to the protection of subscribers’ personal information,
e.g., identifiers, location, data, etc. [...] The security mechanisms
defined in NextGen shall be able to be configured to protect
subscriber’s privacy.
[TR 33.899, Sec. 5.7.1] The subscription privacy is very important
area for Next Generation system as can be seen by the growing
attention towards it, both inside and outside the 3GPP world. [...]
This important role given to privacy can be explained by nu-
merous, critical attacks that have breached privacy (e.g., with IMSI-
catchers [36, 37]) in previous generations; see the survey [33]. We
also recall that privacy was already a concern in 3G:
[TS 133.102, Sec. 5.1.1] (3G) The following security features re-
lated to user identity confidentiality are provided:
• user identity confidentiality: the property that the permanent
user identity (IMSI) of a user to whom a services is delivered cannot
be eavesdropped on the radio access link;
• user location confidentiality: the property that the presence or
the arrival of a user in a certain area cannot be determined by
eavesdropping on the radio access link;
• user untraceability: the property that an intruder cannot deduce
whether different services are delivered to the same user by eaves-
dropping on the radio access link.
Thus, 3G already had security requirements for user identity
confidentiality, anonymity, and untraceability. However, these prop-
erties are required by the standard only against a passive attacker,
i.e., one who only eavesdrops on the radio link. We criticize this
restriction in Section 5.2.3. We now list more precise requirements
on privacy in 5G.
In 5G, the SUPI is considered sensitive and must remain secret
since it uniquely identifies users [TS 33.501, Sec. 5.2.5,6.12]. Indeed,
an attacker who obtains this value can identify a subscriber, leading
to classical user location attacks (see [TS 133.102, Sec. 5.1.1] above),
much like passive IMSI-catcher attacks. Formally, the SUPI shall
remain secret in the presence of a passive attacker .
Similarly, the SQN must remain secret [TS 33.102, Sec. 6.2.3,
C.3.2]. An additional reason that is not explicitly stated is that
the SQN leaks the number of successful authentications the corre-
sponding USIM has performed since it was manufactured, which is
strongly correlated to its age and activity. This is even more critical
when the attacker learns the SQN at different times, as this allows
activity estimation for that time-period. Formally, the SQN shall
remain secret in the presence of a passive attacker .
Preventing the attacker from learning identifying data (i.e., SUPI,
SQN) is insufficient protection against privacy attacks such as
traceability attacks (we show an example in Section 5.2.3). While
no formal and explicit statement is made on the necessity of en-
suring untraceability for 5G, several claims in TR and TS docu-
ments (see Appendix D.2.3) and the fact that it was required for 3G
([TS 133.102, Sec. 5.1.1], see above), suggest that this property is
relevant for 5G as well. Therefore, formally, 5G authenticationmeth-
ods should provide untraceability of the subscribers in the presence
of a passive attacker .
3.3 Security Goals are Underspecified
We now discuss the aforementioned standardized security goals
and critique the lack of precision in the standard. We show that
the requirements specified in the standard are not sufficient to
provide the expected security guarantees in the context of mobile
communication telephony use cases. This is completely indepen-
dent of whether or not the proposed protocols actually fulfill these
properties (which we examine in Section 5).
First, given that the protocol is an Authenticated Key Exchange
protocol, we expect at least mutual authentication requirements
and agreement properties on the established key. It is thus surpris-
ing that the standard does not require any agreement on KSEAF.
The different pairs of roles, especially subscribers and SNs should
at least obtain non-injective agreement on the shared key KSEAF.
Moreover, KSEAF should be different for each session. This is a criti-
cal requirement, especially for typical use cases for these protocols.
Indeed, if this property is not provided, an attacker could make UEs
and SNs establish a secure channel based on a key that has been
previously used, and could therefore replay user data. The crucial
missing requirements are injective agreements on KSEAF between
pairs of parties, in particular between the SNs and subscribers.
The standard specifies authentication properties as weak autho-
rization properties that can be formalized as non-injective agree-
ment on the roles’ identifiers, or simply weak agreement prop-
erties (see Section 3.2.1). We discuss the standard’s restriction to
“implicit authentication” in Section 5.2.2. As explained earlier, 5G
requires HNs to have the assurance that UEs are attached to SNs
[TS 33.501, Sec. 6.1.4.1] currently. However, a non-injective agree-
ment on SNname from an HN towards a subscriber is too weak
since it suffices that the subscriber has attached to the correspond-
ing SN in some session in the past to fulfill the property. It is crucial
for the HNs to obtain assurance that the subscriber is attached to
the SN during the present session. The derivation of KSEAF includes
SNname for the binding to SN . This derivation also includes a nonce
R, from which we obtain the desired assurance as a corollary of
injective agreement on KSEAF from the HNs towards the subscribers,
which we consider instead.
Similarly, the subscribers should have the assurance that the SNs
with which they establish secure channels are known and trusted
by their HNs at the time of the authentication, not only in some past
session. Therefore, they should obtain injective agreement on KSEAF
(which is bound to SNname) with the HNs. While less critical, other
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pairs of roles should also have stronger assurance. We describe how
the standard can be improved in this regard in Section 5.3.
4 FORMAL MODELS
In this section, we give a basic introduction to the symbolic model of
cryptographic protocols and the tool Tamarin that automates rea-
soning in this model (Section 4.1). Afterwards, we give an overview
on how security properties can be modeled using Tamarin (Sec-
tion 4.2). Next, after describing our modeling choices (Section 4.3),
we describe the challenges associated with modeling a large, com-
plex protocol like 5G AKA and howwe overcame them (Section 4.4).
4.1 The Tamarin Prover
To analyze 5G AKA, we used the Tamarin prover [34]. Tamarin is
a state-of-the-art protocol verification tool for the symbolic model,
which supports stateful protocols, a high level of automation, and
equivalence properties [10], which are necessary to model privacy
properties such as unlinkability. It has previously been applied
to real-world protocols with complex state machines, numerous
messages, and complex security properties such as TLS 1.3 [18].
Moreover, it was recently extended with support for XOR [22], a
key ingredient for faithfully analyzing 5G AKA. We chose Tamarin
as it is currently the only tool that combines all these features,
which are essential for a detailed analysis of 5G AKA.
In the symbolic model and a fortiori in Tamarin, messages are
described as terms. For example, enc(m,k) represents the message
m encrypted using the key k . The algebraic properties of the crypto-
graphic functions are then specified using equations over terms. For
example the equation dec(enc(m,k),k) =m specifies the expected
semantics for symmetric encryption: the decryption using the en-
cryption key yields the plaintext. As is common in the symbolic
model, cryptographic messages do not satisfy other properties than
those intended algebraic properties, yielding the so-called black
box cryptography assumption (e.g., one cannot exploit potential
weaknesses in cryptographic primitives).
The protocol itself is described using multi-set rewrite rules.
These rules manipulate multisets of facts, which model the current
state of the system with terms as arguments.
Example 4.1. The following rules describe a simple protocol that
sends an encrypted message. The first rule creates a new long-term
shared key k (the fact !Ltk is persistent: it can be used as a premise
multiple times). The second rule describes the agent A who sends a
fresh messagem together with its MAC with the shared key k to B.
Finally, the third rule describes B who is expecting a message and
a corresponding MAC with k as input. Note that the third rule can
only be triggered if the input matches the premise, i.e., if the input
message is correctly MACed with k .
Create_Ltk : [Fr(k)]−[]→[!Ltk(k)],
Send_A : [!Ltk(k), Fr(m)]−[ Sent(m) ]→[Out(⟨m,mac(m,k)⟩)],
Receive_B : [!Ltk(k), In(⟨m,mac(m,k)⟩)]−[ Received(x) ]→[] □
These rules yield a labeled transition system describing the pos-
sible protocol executions (see [1, 34] for details on syntax and se-
mantics). Tamarin combines the protocol semantics with a Dolev-
Yao [21] style attacker. This attacker controls the entire network and
can thereby intercept, delete, modify, delay, inject, and build new
messages. However, the attacker is limited by the cryptography:
he cannot forge signatures or decrypt messages without knowing
the key (black box cryptography assumption). He can nevertheless
apply any function (e.g., hashing, XOR, encryption, pairing, . . . ) to
messages he knows to compute new messages.
4.2 Formalizing Security Goals in Tamarin
In Tamarin, security properties are specified in two different ways.
First, trace properties, such as secrecy or variants of authentication,
are specified using formulas in a first-order logic with timepoints.
Example 4.2. Consider the multiset rewrite rules given in Exam-
ple 4.1. The following property specifies a form of non-injective
agreement on the message, i.e., that any message received by B was
previously sent by A:
∀i,m.Received(m)@i ⇒ (∃j .Sent(m)@j ∧ j ⋖ i).
Since the 5G AKA protocol features multiple roles and multiple
instantiations thereof, agreement properties additionally require
that the views of the two partners (who is playing which role, and
what is the identity of the partner) actually match; see Appendix C.
For each specified property, Tamarin checks that the property
holds for all possible protocol executions, and all possible attacker
behaviors. To achieve this, Tamarin explores all possible executions
in a backward manner, searching for reachable attack states, which
are counterexamples to the security properties.
Equivalence properties, such as unlinkability, are expressed by
requiring that two instances of the protocol cannot be distinguished
by the attacker. Such properties are specified using diff -terms
(which take two arguments), essentially defining two different in-
stances of the protocol that only differ in some terms. Tamarin then
checks observational equivalence (see [10]), i.e., it compares the two
resulting systems and checks that the attacker cannot distinguish
them for any protocol execution and any adversarial behaviors.
In fully automatic mode, Tamarin either returns a proof that
the property holds, or a counterexample/attack if the property is
violated, or it may not terminate as the underlying problem is un-
decidable. Tamarin can also be used in interactive mode, where
the user can guide the proof search. Moreover the user can supply
heuristics called oracles to guide the proof search in a sound way.
We heavily rely on heuristics in our analyses as they allow us to
tame the protocol’s complexity, as explained below.
4.3 Modeling Choices
To better delimit the scope of our model and our analyses, we now
describe some of our modeling choices.
Architecture. We consider three roles (subscribers, SNs, and HNs)
and reason with respect to unboundedly many instances of each
role. As expected, each subscriber credential is stored in at most one
HN . We model communication channels between these parties that
provide security properties as explained in Section 3.1. Additionally,
the messages exchanged are tagged on the authenticated channel
between the SNs and HNs. This models the implicit assumption that
the authenticated channel between an SN and an HN role instance
is protected from type flaw attacks.
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Modeling Cryptographic Messages. We model and treat the sub-
scribers’ SQNs as natural numbers (using a standard encoding based
on multisets [1, 35]). We assume the attacker cannot follow UEs
from their creation so the SQN is not known (see Section 3.1) at
first, and we thus start the sequence number with a random value.
The freshness check (i.e., (ii) from Figure 3) is faithfully modelled as
a natural number comparison. Since the SQN may become out-of-
sync during normal protocol execution, we also consider an attacker
who can arbitrarily increase SQNUE (UE does not allow decrease).
Note that the attacker can already increase SQNHN by repeatedly
triggering authentication material requests. We fully model the re-
synchronizationmechanism and let theHNs update their SQNHN ac-
cordingly. The concealment of the SQN, using Exclusive-OR (XOR),
is faithfully modeled by relying on the recent extension of Tamarin
with equational theories including XOR [22].
Compromise Scenarios. We model various compromise scenarios:
secret key reveals (of K or skHN), reveals of the SUPI or the initial
value of SQN, and SN compromises (i.e., the attacker gains access to
an authenticated channel with the HNs). This is needed mainly for
two reasons. First, the specification itself considers some of those
scenarios and still requires some security guarantees to hold (cf. the
compromised SNs from Section 3.1). Second, this enables a com-
prehensive analysis to identify the minimal assumptions required
for a property to hold. For instance, if some critical authentication
property were violated when the attacker could access the initial
value of the SQN, this would represent a potential vulnerability in
the protocol since the SQN is not a strong secret and the search
space of the SQN that the attacker needs to explore could be further
reduced by exploiting the meaning of this counter.
Implicit Authentication. We equip the model with an optional
key-confirmation roundtrip where the subscribers and SNs confirm
their key KSEAF by MACing different constants. Our security analy-
sis is then parametric in this roundtrip, allowing us to derive which
properties hold without key confirmation, and what is gained by
including this key confirmation step.
Simplifications Made. As usual in the symbolic model, we omit
message bit lengths. Some key derivation functions also take the
length of their arguments to prevent type-flaw attacks. This is cov-
ered in our model as such length-based misinterpretation cannot
happen. The protocols under study feature some sub-messages that
are publicly known constants, for example, fixed strings like AMF,
ABBA, or ’MAC_Failure’. We mostly omit such sub-messages,
unless they are useful as tags. We do not model the optional, non-
normative protection against wrapping around the SQN
[TS 33.102, Sec. C]. Note that this is in line with our modeling
of the SQN as a natural number for which no wrapping can occur.
The 5G AKA protocol establishes a session key, to which a key
identifier is associated (the key set identifier ngKSI). Such identi-
fiers are needed for subsequent procedures only and do not interact
with the authentication methods and hence we omit them. An SN
may create a pseudonym, called 5G-GUTI, associated with the SUPI
of a subscriber who is visiting this SN , in order to recognize this
subscriber in a subsequent session. We omit this optional mecha-
nism. Authentication tokens do not expire in our model as is usual
in symbolic models. However, since such mechanisms are never
clearly specified in normative documents, we emphasize that critical
security properties should not rely on them.
4.4 Tamarin Models of 5G AKA
We have built a Tamarin model for the 5G AKA authentication
method which enables automated security analyses. Our models
and associated documentation are available online [9], and use
Tamarin v1.4.0 [2], which includes XOR support.
Writing a formal model of such a substantial real-world protocol
is challenging. However, the real difficulty is doing this in a way
that enables effective reasoning about the models, i.e., is amenable
to automation. We now describe this modeling as well as the proof
strategies we developed, and argue why this can serve as a basis
for future analyses of protocols in the AKA family.
4.4.1 Challenges. The 5G AKA protocol uses a combination of
features that make reasoning about these models highly complex.
First, 5G AKA is a stateful protocol, i.e., it relies on internal states
(the SQNs) that are persistent across sessions and that are mutable.
In the symbolic model, the set of values these states can take — all
natural numbers — is unbounded. This feature alone excludes most
verification tools. Verifiers for a bounded number of sessions are not
a viable choice, simply due to the size of a single session. Moreover,
the sequence numbers are not only internal counters, they are also
used for comparison on input. This requires the ability to compare
two values (see Section 4.3) in the chosen representation of natural
numbers. This is demanding in terms of proof efforts: to the best of
our knowledge, this is the first time a complete, real-world proto-
col relying on natural numbers and comparisons is analyzed with
an automated formal verifier in the unbounded setting. Previous
examples are limited to the case of just an internal counter for a
TPM [30] or small examples, like simplified Yubikey [28].
Second, 5G AKA heavily relies on XOR to conceal the value of
SQNs. Reasoning about XOR in the symbolic model is challenging
and its integration in Tamarin is recent [22]. Intuitively, this is be-
cause of the intricate algebraic properties of XOR (i.e., associativity,
commutativity, cancellation, and neutral element). This consider-
ably increase the search space when proving properties. Again, in
the symbolic model, we are not aware of any formal analysis of
such a large-scale real-world protocol featuring XOR.
Finally, the state-machine of the 5G AKA protocol is large and
complex. Role instantiations can be in 14 different states. Evolution
between those states includes numerous loops, notably because
of the persistent and mutable states’ SQNs, e.g., sessions can be
repeated while using a given SQN.
4.4.2 Proof Strategies. The way SQNs are updated on the sub-
scribers’ and HN ’s sides, in particular with the re-synchronization
procedure, induces complex state-changes that must be tackled by
our proof strategies. Manual proofs are not feasible due to the size of
the search space one would have to explore. In contrast, Tamarin’s
fully automatic mode fails to prove relevant security properties and
even extremely weak properties such as the full executability of
the protocols. Our work straddles this divide: we developed a proof
structure based on intermediate lemmas (called helping lemmas) as
well as proof strategies for proving these lemmas and the security
properties. Proof strategies are implemented through oracles that
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offer a light-weight tactic language, implemented in Python, to
guide the proof search in Tamarin.
The key helping lemmas we prove state that the SQN associated
to a subscriber stored on his side (respectively on its HN ’s side) is
strictly increasing (respectively monotonically increasing). Thanks
to our chosen modeling of the states’ SQNs as multisets and the
comparisons of SQNs based on pattern-matching, we were able
to prove the aforementioned lemmas by induction with a simple,
general proof strategy. The security properties, however, require
dedicated and involved proof strategies (∼1000 LoC of Python). The
effort of writing such generic proof strategies represents several
person-months.
4.4.3 Our Models. Based on our modeling choices, we built a com-
plete model of 5G AKA (preceded by the initialization protocol) that
is amenable to automation. We model fully parametric compromise
scenarios that enables one to easily choose what kind of reveals or
compromises are considered when proving properties. We also im-
plement the key confirmation roundtrip in a modular way: one can
consider authentication properties after this roundtrip or without.
The protocol model itself consists of roughly 500 LoC.
Our model includes all the necessary lemmas: helping lemmas,
sanity-check lemmas, and the lemmas that check the relevant se-
curity properties against the 5G AKA protocol. Since we aim at
identifying the minimal assumptions required for the stated prop-
erties to hold, we prove several lemmas for each security property.
First, we state a lemma showing that the property holds under a
certain set of assumptions. Second, we show the minimality of this
set of assumptions. We do this by disproving all versions of the
previous lemma where the set of assumptions is reduced by just
one assumption. This requires 124 different lemmas and ca. 1000
LoC. Tamarin needs ca. 5 hours to automatically establish all the
proofs and find all the attacks.
Our model of 5G AKA is general in that it can be used to model
all other protocols from the AKA family requiring only localized
modifications in the model. Part of the model (creation or role
instantiations, reveal and compromise modelings, etc.) would not
change, but the roughly 300 LoC defining the main flow of the
protocol would have to be adapted. The size of this change depends
on how different the chosen protocol is to 5G AKA. We expect
our oracle to be still valid, at least after minor modifications to
the model. Furthermore, given that our analysis is fully automatic
(thanks to our proof strategies), our model can be easily kept up-
to-date as the standard further evolves and any change in terms of
provided security guarantees can then be automatically identified
by the tool.
5 SECURITY ANALYSIS
5.1 Results
We present the results of our comprehensive analysis of the 5G AKA
protocol. We emphasize that we automatically analyze the formal se-
curity guarantees that the protocol provides for an unbounded num-
ber of sessions executed by honest and compromised subscribers,
SNs, and HNs when used in combinationwith the initiation protocol.
Thus, our analysis accounts for all potential unintended interac-
tions an attacker could exploit between these sub-protocols run by
all possible instantiations of the three roles we consider.
We depict the outcome of our analysis of authentication proper-
ties in Table 1. For each pair of parties, we present the minimal as-
sumptions required to achieve authentication properties: i.e., weak
agreement, non-injective agreement, and injective agreement. We
only consider agreement on relevant data; i.e., KSEAF, SNname , and
the SUPI (recall that the SUPI already contains idHN). The assump-
tions are minimal in that strengthening the attacker’s capabilities
in any direction violates the property. The symbol denotes that
the property is violated for the weakest threat model where all
participants are honest, none of the compromise scenarios is con-
sidered, and key confirmation is systematically enforced. Similarly,
we present our results concerning secrecy properties in Table 2.
We only check for 2-party authentication properties, which ex-
presses well the security goals of 5G AKA. Note however that we
obtain a form of 3-party agreement property (where all 3 parties’
views coincide) as a corollary of three 2-party agreement properties.
This is because we check for strong 2-party agreement properties
on several data points and identifiers simultaneously.
5.2 Discussion
Table 1 clearly shows the extent that the 5G standard underspec-
ifies authentication requirements (recall that [·] denotes explicit
goals); see Section 3.3. We also indicate a number of properties
that are violated even in the best-case scenario ( ). We discuss why
in Section 5.2.1. Afterwards, we explain and critique the use of
key confirmation in Section 5.2.2. We discuss privacy properties
in Section 5.2.3. Finally, our results concerning secrecy properties
are as expected and are not discussed further. Also, perfect forward
secrecy of KSEAF is violated as expected.
5.2.1 Missing Security Assumption. The 5G AKA protocol fails
to meet several security goals that are explicitly required as well
as other critical security properties. This is still true under the
assumptions specified in the standard, even after a successful key-
confirmation phase (see in Table 1). More specifically, the agree-
ment properties on KSEAF between the subscribers and SNs are
violated. So is weak agreement from the subscribers towards the
SNs. This is caused by the lack of a binding assumption on the chan-
nel between SNs and HNs and because the SUPI is sent to the SN
in a different message than the message containing KSEAF, which
is sent earlier. Therefore, as soon as a pair of an SN and an HN
runs two sessions concurrently, there is no assurance that the SUPI
the SN receives at the end of the protocol actually corresponds to
the KSEAF it has received earlier (it could correspond to another
concurrent session). As a consequence, an SN may associate the
session key KSEAF to the correct subscriber (a necessary condition
for the key confirmation to be successful), but to the wrong SUPI, vi-
olating the aforementioned properties. In practice, this could allow
an attacker to make the HN bill someone else (i.e., with a different
SUPI) for services he consumes from an SN (i.e., encrypted with
KSEAF). Thus, the binding property for the channel between the SNs
and HNs appears to be a critical security assumption, and should
be explicitly mentioned in the standard. This weakness has been
introduced in the version v0.8.0 of the standard (published in
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Point of view UE SN HN
Partner SN HN UE HN UE SN
Agreement NI I NI I NI I NI I NI I NI I
on KSEAF ¬K∧k-c ¬K∧k-c ¬ch ¬K∧¬ch ¬K ¬K ¬ch ¬ch
on SUPI wa × wa × wa × [¬ch] × wa × × ×
on SNname wa × [¬K∧k-c] × wa × wa × [¬K] × wa ×
Weak agreement [ ] ¬K [¬K∧¬ch] ¬ch ¬K ¬ch
Table 1: Minimal assumptions required for 5G AKA to achieve authentication properties. We denote subscribers by UE, non-
injective by NI, and injective by I. Assumptions are expressed in terms of forbidden reveals (e.g., ¬K , meaning the property
only holds when K is not revealed). We also indicate whether a key confirmation phase is needed with k-c while ¬ch denotes
an uncompromised channel between SN and HN . When not otherwise specified, the worst-case scenario is considered; that
is K ,SQN,SUPI,skHN, and the channel between SN and HN are compromised and the key confirmation phase is skipped. ×: the
property is violated by definition (e.g., because SUPI is constant). wa: the property coincides with weak agreement and requires
same assumptions. The explicit goals given in the specification are denoted by [·] around them.
Point of view UE SN HN
KSEAF ¬K∧¬ch ¬K∧¬ch ¬K∧¬ch
PFS(KSEAF)
SUPI ¬skHN∧¬ch∗ − ¬skHN∧¬ch∗
K ∅ ∅ ∅
Table 2:Minimal assumptions for 5GAKA to achieve secrecy
properties. We omit the assumption that data that is sup-
posed to be secret is not revealed. See Table 1 for the legend.
The symbol ∗ indicates that there is no dishonest SNs at all
and the underlying property is always violated otherwise.
PFS(·): perfect-forward secrecy. −: property not relevant.
P.o.V. UE SN
Partner SN UE
Agre. NI I NI I
on KSEAF ¬K∧k-c∧¬ch ¬K∧k-c∧¬ch ¬K∧¬ch ¬K∧¬ch
Weak agre. [¬K∧k-c∧¬ch] [¬K∧¬ch]
Table 3: Minimal assumptions required for 5G AKA to
achieve authentication properties between UEs and SNs, as-
suming that the channel between HNs and SNs is binding.
Agreements on SUPI and SNname are not impacted.
March 2018). In the previous version (v0.7.1), the SUPI was sent
by the HN to the SN together with the challenge3, thus preventing
the aforementioned attack and making the binding assumption
unnecessary. However, the final version of the standard requires
this additional assumption. A similar looking issue, but between
two parts of the HN has been previously observed by [20], but it is
an entirely different concern than the one we describe.
Table 3 depicts additional security properties the 5G AKA proto-
col provides when the channel between the SNs andHNs is assumed
3To the best of our knowledge, the rationale behind the new version is to let HN wait
for the proof of the subscriber’s recent aliveness before disclosing the corresponding
SUPI to SNs that may be malicious or dishonest.
to be binding. Under this assumption, the previously violated prop-
erties are now satisfied under reasonable threat models. We only
show results for UEs and SNs to show how their guarantees change.
5.2.2 Implicit Authentication. A successful key-confirmation
roundtrip is required to obtain crucial security guarantees. More
precisely, this roundtrip is required for all agreement properties
from the subscribers’ point of view except weak agreement towards
the HNs. Indeed, an attacker can impersonate an SN towards a sub-
scriber but is unable to learn the KSEAF key the subscriber has
computed.
[TS 33.501, Sec. 5.1.2] The meaning of ‘implicit key authentica-
tion’ here is that authentication is provided through the successful
use of keys resulting from authentication and key agreement in sub-
sequent procedures.
The 5G standard only requires implicit authentication properties
for the subscribers. However, the standard neither specifies that
subscribers must wait for this key confirmation to be successful
before continuing nor does it specify this additional roundtrip as
part of the authentication method. As a consequence, the standard
makes a choice that we consider risky: it postpones the handling
and the verification of the additional key confirmation roundtrip
to all possible subsequent procedures (e.g., the NAS security mode
command procedure [TS 33.501, Sec. 6.7.2]). The standard fails to
specify a standalone authentication protocol that provides a rea-
sonable set of security guarantees since some critical properties are
provided only when the protocol is used in specific, appropriate
contexts.
More importantly, since the standard makes the overall security
of the authentication rest on subsequent procedures, it is very chal-
lenging, and out of the scope of the present paper, to assess if all
currently specified subsequent procedures (as well as future ones
that may be added) either correctly mandate the use of this key
confirmation roundtrip or do not require authentication properties
from the subscribers’ point of view towards the SNs. We believe
that there are at least two potential use cases where the above
weakness represents a vulnerability. First, the standard specifies
that SNs can initiate key change on-the-fly [TS 33.501, Sec. 6.9.4.1]
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as well as switch security contexts [TS 33.501, Sec. 6.8], including
keys, parameters, etc.. This raises the question whether a malicious
SN or a fake base station could not fully impersonate a genuine
SN towards the subscribers by changing the session key immedi-
ately after 5G AKA. Second, in a scenario where subscribers use
the presence of SNs for geo-localization or for making sensitive
decisions (related to e.g., emergency calls), an active attacker could
impersonate an SN since the (mismatched) KSEAF key may not be
needed or used.
Finally, the key confirmation roundtrip is not the only option
to achieve the aforementioned missing security guarantees. We
provide and discuss in Section 5.3.3 two alternative solutions that
fix this issue while reducing neccessary communications.
5.2.3 On Privacy. As mentioned in Section 3.2.3, the 5G standard
aims to protect privacy only against passive attackers. 5G AKA
provides an identifier hiding mechanism and sends the SUPI only
in a randomized public key encryption (the Subscription Concealed
Identifier, SUCI). We show with Tamarin that the SUPI indeed
remains confidential, even against active attackers (see Table 2) and
hence also against passive attackers. 5G AKA thus defeats previous
active IMSI-catcher attacks [33], which relied on the subscribers
sending the IMSI (matching SUPI in 5G) in the clear. We also have
modelled a weak, passive attacker and have automatically proven
that he cannot trace subscribers.
We believe that active attackers are realistic threats for most
use cases. Moreover, since privacy is a real concern to the 3GPP,
5G AKA should protect subscribers’ privacy also against active
attackers. Unfortunately, we have found that this is not the case as
the 5G AKA protocol suffers from a traceability attack.
Using Tamarin (see our model [9]), we automatically find the
following attack in 5GAKA. In this attack, the attacker observes one
5G AKA authentication session and later replays the SN ’s message
to some subscriber. From the subscriber’s answer (MAC failure or
Synchronization failure), the attacker can distinguish between the
subscriber observed earlier (in case of Synchronization failure) and
a different subscriber (in case of MAC failure). This attack can be
exploited to track subscribers over time. A variant of this attack
was first described in [5] for the AKA protocol as used in 3G.
5.3 Recommendations
Throughout the paper, we have highlighted weaknesses in the
standard and suggested improvements and refinements. We now
summarize some of them and proposemore precise, provably secure
fixes as a replacement for the key confirmation and the binding
channel assumptions. Again, we emphasize the critical role played
here by our formal interpretation of the standard and our formal
analysis of the described 5G AKA protocol.
5.3.1 Explicit Requirements. As shown in Table 1 and discussed
in Section 3.3, the standard underspecifies security requirements
for the 5G AKA protocol. We suggest that the standard explicitly
requires the missing intended security properties. In particular, it
should be clear that 5G AKA aims at achieving injective agreement
on KSEAF between the subscribers and the SNs which is central
to the protocol’s purpose. The subscribers should obtain injective
agreement on KSEAF with the HNs; they are thereby assured the
HNs recently authorized this session, sinceKSEAF is derived from the
randomR. Finally, theHNs should have injective agreement onKSEAF
with the subscribers, obtaining recent aliveness as a consequence.
5.3.2 Binding Channel. As discussed in Section 5.2.1, a recent up-
date in the standard introduced attacks under the given security
assumptions. There are two solutions to fix this: either the standard
explicitly states an additional security assumption (i.e., the channel
between the SNs and HNs must be binding), or alternatively the 5G
AKA protocol is fixed (without the need for a new assumption) us-
ing the following minor modification: ⟨SUPI, SUCI⟩ is sent instead
of SUPI in the final message from HN to SN . However, it is our
understanding that the binding assumption is a property that is
required for other reasons anyway, such as reliability.
5.3.3 On the Key Confirmation. We already have discussed the
danger of missing key confirmation in 5G AKA in Section 5.2.2.
We now propose two simple modifications to the protocol that
would make key confirmation redundant and unnecessary, there-
fore reducing the number of roundtrips that are needed to achieve
intended security guarantees. Before explaining our fix, note that
the key confirmation was necessary in the first place because the
HNs never commit to a specific SNname when computing the chal-
lenge R,AUTN. Only the key KSEAF is bound to SNname, but the
challenge itself is not.
Our first fix consists of binding AUTN to SNname so that sub-
scribers directly have the proof the HN has committed to a spe-
cific SNname, without even using KSEAF. Formally, AUTN currently
refers to ⟨SQNHN ⊕AK,MAC⟩ whereMAC = f1(K , ⟨SQNHN,R⟩). In
our fix, MAC is replaced by f1(K , ⟨SQNHN,R, SNname⟩). Therefore,
the subscribers can verify the authenticity of the challenge that
commits to a specific SNname. We have formally verified [9] that a
key-confirmation roundtrip is no longer necessary with this fix.
Our second, alternative, fix consists in replacing the full key-
confirmation roundtrip by an unidirectional key confirmation from
the SN only. More precisely, we could add (any) message MACed
with a key derived from KSEAF, sent by the SNs to the subscribers,
at the very end of the protocol. We have proven with Tamarin
that no further guarantees are provided by a full key confirmation,
compared to our (less costly) unidirectional key confirmation.
5.3.4 On Privacy. We recall that the functions f1 and f1∗ are not
explicitly required to protect the confidentiality of their inputs (see
Section 3.1.2). This is however necessary for privacy as these MAC
functions take SQN as input, among others. If these functions were
not confidentiality-preserving, a passive attacker could learn the
subscribers’ SQNs and perform location attacks [33] by tracking
nearby SQNs over time or perform activity monitoring attacks [13].
We also recommend for the standard to explicitly aim at protect-
ing privacy against active attackers and take steps in this direction.
Unfortunately, this would involve significant modifications to the
protocol since at least the failure reasons (MAC/Synchronization
failure) must be hidden from the attacker [5, 23] and the SQN con-
cealment mechanism should be strengthened against active attack-
ers [13], possibly by using proper encryption or using an anonymity
keyAK based on subscriber-generated randomness.We leave a com-
plete evaluation of possible solutions for future work and we expect
our model to be valuable for this process.
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5.3.5 Redundancies. A close look at the cryptographic messages
(see detailed list in Appendix A) and their purposes shows many
redundancies. For instance, in RES∗, the proof of possession of K
is in CK, IK, and RES. R appears to be redundant as well. Simi-
larly, SNname is redundant in the key derivation of KSEAF. Legacy
reasons may explain these redundancies, but these design choices
could be questioned and the protocol simplified.
5.3.6 On the Role of SQN. The purpose of the SQN counters is to
provide replay protection for the subscribers. This mechanism was
introduced in 3G, when the USIM was incapable of generating good
randomness. This is no longer the case in 5G, where USIMs can
perform randomized asymmetric encryption (required to compute
SUCI from SUPI). Therefore, authentication protocols should be
rethought andmore standard challenge-responsemechanisms could
be used to replace the SQN counters. This would benefit the current
authentication methods, which can suffer from de-synchronization
andmust keep the privacy sensitive SQNs up-to-date and sometimes
fail to protect them against attackers (see Section 5.3.4).
5.3.7 On the Benefits of Formal Methods. As argued throughout
this section, the standard could be simplified and improved in var-
ious directions. We recall that formal models, such as our model
of the 5G AKA protocol, have proven to be extremely valuable to
quickly assess the security of suchmodifications and simplifications.
Our model can serve as a basis to accompany the standard’s future
evolution and provides a tool for quickly evaluating the security of
modification proposals.
6 CONCLUSION
We have formally analyzed one of the two authentication methods
in 5G, the one which enhances the previous variant currently used
in 4G. This included a detailed analysis of the standard to identify all
assumptions and security goals, a formal model of the protocol and
security goals as specified in the standard, the automated security
analysis using the Tamarin prover, and a detailed discussion of our
findings. Our models are substantially more detailed than those of
previous work and account for details of the statemachine, counters,
the re-synchronization procedures, and the XOR operations.
While analyzing the standard we discovered that security goals
and assumptions are underspecified or missing, including central
goals like agreement on the session key. Moreover, our analysis in
Tamarin shows that some properties are violated without further
assumptions. A striking example of this is agreement properties on
the session key. We also critique the standard’s choice of implicit
authentication and the lack of key confirmation as this introduces
weaknesses if the protocol is used in ways other than intended.
Finally, our privacy analysis shows that the 5G version of AKA still
fails to ensure unlinkability against an active attacker; this scenario
is, in our opinion, completely realistic.
As future work, we plan to analyze other variants of the AKA
protocol, notably those used in 3G and 4G networks, to see which
security guarantees they provide compared to 5G AKA.Wewill also
follow the future development of the 5G standard as our analysis can
serve as the basis for improving the protocol’s design, in particular
to evaluate ideas and avoid regressions. For example, we identified
one weakness that was introduced in a recent update (from v0.7.1
to v0.8.0). This is a major benefit of tool-based analysis of protocol
design: once the model is constructed, one can quickly test changes
and evaluate different design options.
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A NOTATIONS AND ACRONYMS
We list all the acronyms we introduced throughout the paper in
Table 4 and give a correspondence table between our simplified
terminology and the 3GPP terminology in Table 5.
We describe the cryptographic messages format in Table 6 (ab-
stracting away AMF, other constants and sub-message lengths).
B THE EAP-AKA’ PROTOCOL
We depict the core flow of the EAP-AKA’ protocol in Figure 4. We
omit the MAC failure and Re-synchronization failure phases that
are the same as for 5G-AKA (see Section 2.2.2 and Figure 3). We
also omit the message headers specific to the EAP framework such
as ’EAP Request’ and ’EAP Success’. The key derivation is a
bit different compared to 5G AKA. KSEAF is derived from KAUSF
exactly as in 5G AKA:
KSEAF = KDF(KAUSF, SNname)
but KAUSF is derived differently: KAUSF = MK[1152...1407] (we
write [x ..y] for the substring from bit x to y) where the master key
MK is:
KDF(⟨KDF(IK , SNname),KDF(CK , SNname)⟩, ⟨’EAP-AKA’’, SUPI⟩).
Therefore,
KSEAF = KeySeed(K ,R, SQNHNSNname, SUPI)
= KDF(KDF(⟨KDF(IK , SNname),KDF(CK , SNname)⟩,
⟨’EAP-AKA’’, SUPI⟩)[512..767],
SNname).
The messages AT_MAC are MAC messages over the other sub-
messages as part of the same message. The key in use is Kaut =
MK[1152...1407].
Conceptually, the main difference of EAP-AKA’ compared to 5G
AKA are as follows:
• the challenge xRES does not directly bind the SN’s identity
SNname. However, since the challenge is MACed (with the
session key Kaut) together with SNname, both are de facto
bound together.
• SN serves as a pass-through until the authentication is con-
sidered successful by the HN . Only at this time SN obtains
SUPI and KSEAF from the HN , while it obtains KSEAF already
in the first message in 5G AKA.
C LOWE’S TAXONOMY AND TAMARIN
MODELING
Lowe’s Taxonomy [29] notably defines aliveness, recent aliveness,
weak agreement, non-injective agreement , and injective agreement .
After an introductory example showing how properties are typically
modelled in Tamarin, we show how aliveness and non-injective
agreement properties are modelled. The process for the other prop-
erties is similar.
C.1 Introductory Example: Secrecy
As an introductory example, let us see how secrecy properties are
modeled in Tamarin. For instance, we model the property that the
SUPI of subscribers is never revealed to the attacker. Formally, such
a property is formalized in Tamarin using the formula defined
below, where facts Claim_Secret(a,k) are produced for each rule
of agent a (some subscriber or some HN ) who accesses or stores
the identifier SUPI. Note that K(t) denotes the fact that t is in the
attacker’s Knowledge.
Definition C.1. Secrecy is modeled via the following formula:
∀a t #i . Claim_secret(a, t)@i ⇒ ¬(∃#j . K(t)@j).
C.2 Aliveness
Lowe defines aliveness as follows (excerpt from [29]):
We say that a protocol guarantees to an initiator
A aliveness of another agent B if, whenever
A (acting as initiator) completes a run of the
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Acronym Full name Reference Description (if needed)
AK Anonymity Key Section 2.2
AMF Authentication Management Field Appendix A
AMF(∗) Access and Mobility Management Function Appendix A
ARPF Authentication credential Repository and Processing Function Appendix A
AUSF Authentication Server Function Appendix A
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol Section 2.2
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity Section 2.1 Uniquely identify subscribers
gNB NR Node B Appendix A new generation base station
GUTI Globally Unique Temporary UE Identity Section 4.3
ME Mobile Equipment Section 2.1
MNC Mobile Country Code Appendix A Uniquely identify HNs’ countries
MNC Mobile Network Code Appendix A Uniquely identity HNs in a country
RAND (R) Random Challenge Section 2.2
RES RESponse Appendix A
SEAF SEcurity Anchor Function Appendix A
SUCI Subscription Concealed Identifier Section 2.2
SUPI Subscription Permanent Identifier Section 2.1 Uniquely identify a subscriber and its HN
SQN SeQuence Number Section 2.1
UDM Unified Data Management Appendix A
USIM Universal Subscriber Identity Module Appendix A
XRES eXpected RESponse Appendix A
SIDF Subscription Identifier De-concealing Function Appendix A
SUPI Subscription Concealed Identifier Section 2.1
SUCI Subscription Permanent Identifier Section 2.2 Randomized encryption of SUPI
SNid SN identity Appendix A Uniquely identify SNs
Table 4: Acronyms and abbreviations (mostly from [TS 33.501, Sec. 3.2])
Our notion Correspondent notion in TS33.501
Serving Network Combination of SEAF, AMF(∗) and gNB
Home Network Combination of AUSF, ARPF, UDM and SIDF
Table 5: Correspondence between our terminology with the one of TS33.501
protocol, apparently with responder B, then B
has previously been running the protocol.
Let us see how this property is mathematically modelled in
Tamarin.We assume that theTamarinmodel is equippedwith facts
Claim_commit(a,b, ⟨A,B⟩) (i.e., an agent a of role A claims it has
established aliveness of b whose role is B) and Claim_running(b,B)
(i.e., an agent b of role B claims it has run the protocol).
Definition C.2. Aliveness of a role A towards a role B is modeled
via the following formula:
∀a b #i . Claim_commit(a,b, ⟨A,B⟩)@i ⇒∃#j . Claim_running(b,B)@j .
Note that we do not restrict the timestamp #j to be before the
timestamp #i (e.g.,with a constraint #j⋖#i) since the trace semantics
of Tamarin already accounts for this constraint. More precisely,
if, for some execution, there was a fact Claim_running(b,B)@j but
only after the factClaim_commit(a,b, ⟨A,B⟩)@i (i.e., #i⋖#j), then it
would suffice, for falsifying the property, to consider a prefix of the
considered execution that contains Claim_commit(a,b, ⟨A,B⟩)@i
but not Claim_running(b,B)@j.
C.3 Non-injective Agreement
Another example is the non-injective agreement property, defined
as follows (excerpt from [29]):
We say that a protocol guarantees to an initiator
A non-injective agreement with a responder B
on a set of data items ts (where ts is a set of free
variables appearing in the protocol description)
if, whenever A (acting as initiator) completes
a run of the protocol, apparently with respon-
der B, then B has previously been running the
protocol, apparently with A, and was acting
as responder in his run, and the two agents
agreed on the data values corresponding to all
the variables in ts .
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Message Name Content Internal Ref. Specification
SUPI ⟨IMSI,MMC,MNC⟩ Section 2.1 [TS23.501, Sec. 5.9.2]
SUCI ⟨aenc(⟨SUPI,Rs ⟩,pkHN),MMC,MNC⟩ Section 2.2 [TS 33.501, Sec. C.3]
SNname ⟨’5G’, ’:’, SNid⟩ Section 2.1 [TS 33.501, Sec. 6.1.1.4]
MAC f1(K , ⟨SQNHN,R⟩) Section 2.2 [TS 133.102, Sec. 6.3.2]
AK f5(K ,R) Section 2.2 [TS 133.102, Sec. 6.3.2]
AUTN ⟨SQNHN ⊕ AK,MAC⟩ Section 2.2 [TS 33.501, Sec. 6.1.3]
RES f2(K ,R) Section 2.2 [TS 133.102, Sec. 6.3.2]
CK f3(K ,R) Appendix A [TS 133.102, Sec. 6.3.2]
IK f4(K ,R) Appendix A [TS 133.102, Sec. 6.3.2]
RES∗ KDF(⟨CK, IK⟩, ⟨SNname,R, RES⟩) Section 2.2 [TS 33.501, Sec. A.4]
Challenge(K ,R, SNname) RES∗ Section 2.2 None
HXRES∗ SHA256(⟨R, RES∗⟩) Section 2.2 [TS 33.501, Sec. A.5]
MACS f1∗(K , ⟨SQNUE,R⟩) Section 2.2 [TS 133.102, Sec. 6.3.3]
AKS f5∗(K ,R) Section 2.2 [TS 133.102, Sec. 6.3.3]
AUTS ⟨SQNUE ⊕ AKS,MACS⟩ Section 2.2 [TS 133.102, Sec. 6.3.3]
KAUSF KDF(⟨CK, IK⟩, ⟨SNname, SQN ⊕ AK⟩) Section 2.2 [TS 33.501, Sec. A.2]
KSEAF KDF(KAUSF, SNname) Section 2.2 [TS 33.501, Sec. A.6]
KeySeed(K ,R, SQNHN, SNname) KSEAF Section 2.2 None
Table 6: Notations and Messages
Subscriber
K, SUPI,
SQNUE, SNname
Serving Network
SNname, SUCI
Home Network
K, SUPI,
SQNHN, SNname
new random R
MAC ← f1(K, ⟨SQNHN, R ⟩)
AK ← f5(K, R)
CONC ← SQNHN ⊕ AK
AUTN ← ⟨CONC, MAC⟩
xRES ← f2(K, R)
KSEAF ← KeySeed′(K, R, SQNHN, SNname, SUPI)
SQNHN ← SQNHN + 1
R, AUTN, SNname, AT_MACR, AUTN, SNname, AT_MAC
⟨xCONC, xMAC⟩ ← AUTN
AK ← f5(K, R)
xSQNHN ← AK ⊕ xCONC
MAC ← f1(K, ⟨SQNHN, R ⟩)
CHECK (i) xMAC = MAC, validity of AT_MAC, SNname and
(ii) SQNUE < xSQNHN
SQNUE ← xSQNHN
RES ← f2(K, R)
KSEAF ← KeySeed′(K, R, SQNHN, SNname, SUPI)
RES, AT_MAC RES, AT_MAC
if AT_MAC invalid or RES , XRES
then abort
KSEAF, SUPI
Successful Authentication
If (i) and (ii) (Expected Response)
Figure 4: The EAP-AKA’ protocol (continuing Figure 2). AT_MAC denotes a MAC over the other messages with key K .
16
A Formal Analysis of 5G Authentication D. Basin, J. Dreier, L. Hirschi, S. Radomirović, R. Sasse and V. Stettler
We assume that the Tamarin model is equipped with facts
Claim_commit_agr(a,b, ⟨A,B, ts ⟩) (i.e., an agent a of role A claims
it has established agreement on data t with b whose role is B) and
Claim_running_agr(b,a, ⟨A,B, ts ⟩) (i.e., an agent b of role B claims
it tries to establish agreement on data t with a whose role isA). The
above property is modelled as follows.
Definition C.3. Non-injective agreement on data t of a role A
towards a role B is modeled via the following formula:
∀a b t #i . Claim_commit_agr(a,b, ⟨A,B, ts ⟩)@i ⇒(∃#j . Claim_running_agr(b,a, ⟨A,B, ts ⟩)@j).
D SECURITY ASSUMPTIONS AND GOALS
This section extends Section 3.
This section is dedicated to our interpretation of security assump-
tions and goals that are relevant to authentication methods in 5G as
precise formal statements. We shall support our interpretation by
relevant excerpts from Technical Specification (TS) documents and
Technical Requirement (TR) documents issued by 3GPP. Note that
we may cite documents specifying aspects of earlier generations
(3G and 4G) when relevant.
D.1 Security Assumptions and Threat Model
D.1.1 Assumptions on Channels.
Channel SN-HN. As part of the E2E core network, the channel
between the SN and HN is supposed to provide confidentiality,
integrity, authenticity, and, replay protection. Those assumptions
are explicitly specified:
[TS 33.501, Sec. 5.9.3] Requirements for E2E core net-
work interconnection security:
• The solution shall provide confidentiality and/or integrity
end-to-end between source and destination network for
specific message elements identified in the present docu-
ment. For this requirement to be fulfilled, the SEPP - cf [2],
clause 6.2.17 shall be present at the edge of the source and
destination networks dedicated to handling e2e Core Net-
work Interconnection Security. The confidentiality and/or
integrity for the message elements is provided between two
SEPPs of the source and destination PLMN-.
• The destination network shall be able to determine the
authenticity of the source network that sent the specific
message elements protected according to the preceding
bullet. For this requirement to be fulfilled, it shall suffice
that a SEPP in the destination network that is dedicated to
handling e2e Core Network Interconnection Security can
determine the authenticity of the source network.
• The solution shall cover prevention of replay attacks.
Channel Subscribers-SNs. The channel between the subscribers
and SNs, on the radio physical layer, is subject to eavesdropping
(by passive attackers) or manipulations, interception, and injection
of messages (by an active attacker). A passive attacker listens to
signaling messages (i.e., messages sent on the radio physical layer)
on specific bandwidths and can therefore easily eavesdrop on all
messages exchanged in its vicinity. An active attacker sets up a
fake base station to receive and send signaling messages; e.g., to
impersonate SNs. While no 5G-specific hardware is publicly avail-
able yet, we recall how easily an attacker can set-up fake base
stations in 4G using open-source and freely available software and
hardware [24, 36]. From now on, we shall consider active attackers,
except when explicitly stated otherwise.
D.1.2 Assumptions on Cryptographic Primitives. According to
[TS 33.102, Sec. 3.2,6.3.2], the functions f1, f1∗, f2 are message au-
thentication functions while f3, f4, f5, f5∗ are key derivation func-
tions. To the best of our knowledge, there is no standardized, explicit
security requirements for these functions. One could infer from
the informal presentation [TS 33.102, Sec. 3.2] that the former are
integrity protected and the latter are integrity and confidentiality
protected. However, since f1 and f1∗ are used to MAC sensitive
pieces of data such as SQN (see the Section dedicated to privacy in
Appendix D.2.3), it is our understanding that they should addition-
ally preserve the confidentiality of their inputs.
Therefore, we assume f1, f1∗, f3, f4, f5, f5∗ are integrity and con-
fidentiality protected while f2 is integrity protected. We also stress
that f1 and f1∗ are underspecified.
D.1.3 Assumptions on Parties. We consider compromised scenarios
in order to provide stronger and more fine-grained guarantees. Our
analyses will be parametrized by those compromised scenarios; in
the worst case, a property will hold only when the attacker cannot
compromise any agent. First, we consider an attacker who can
compromise certain SNs. This means that the attacker gets access
to an authenticated channel between the compromised SN and
HNs, which he can use to eavesdrop on and inject messages. This
is a reasonable assumption in 5G, where authentication methods
should provide security guarantees even in presence of genuine but
malicious SNs. In such situations, the HNs may cooperate with such
SNs to authenticate some subscriber. In practice, this may happen
in roaming situations. The following excerpt shows that in 5G, this
is a threat model that should be considered (home refers to HN and
visited network refers to SN ):
[TS 33.501, Sec. 6.1.4.1] Increased home control: The au-
thentication and key agreement protocols mandated to pro-
vide increased home control [compared to previous gen-
erations]. The feature of increased home control is use-
ful in preventing certain types of fraud, e.g. fraudulent
Nudm_UECM_Registration Request for registering the sub-
scriber’s serving AMF in UDM that are not actually present
in the visited network.
Furthermore, we consider that the attacker may have genuine
USIMs and compromised USIMs under its control. For those com-
promised subscribers, the attacker can access all secret values stored
in the USIMs; i.e., SUPI, K , and SQN. Finally, the attacker can access
all long-term secrets K , skHN, and SUPI from compromised HNs.
D.1.4 Assumptions on Data Protection.
Subscriber credentials. The subscriber credentials, notably the
key K and the identifier SUPI, shared between subscribers and HNs,
should be initially secret (provided they belong to uncompromised
agents):
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[TS 33.501, Sec. 3.1] Subscription credential(s): set of val-
ues in the USIM and the ARPF, consisting of at least the
long-term key(s) and the subscription identifier SUPI, used to
uniquely identify a subscription and to mutually authenticate
the UE and 5G core network.
[TS 33.501, Sec. 5.2.4] The following requirements apply
for the storage and processing of the subscription cre-
dentials used to access the 5G network:
• The subscription credential(s) shall be integrity protected
within the UE using a tamper resistant secure hardware
component.
• The long-term key(s) of the subscription credential(s) (i.e.
K) shall be confidentiality protected within the UE using a
tamper resistant secure hardware component.
• The long-term key(s) of the subscription credential(s) shall
never be available in the clear outside of the tamper resis-
tant secure hardware component.
• The authentication algorithm(s) that make use of the sub-
scription credentials shall always be executed within the
tamper resistant secure hardware component.
• It shall be possible to perform a security evaluation / assess-
ment according to the respective security requirements of
the tamper resistant secure hardware component.
NOTE: The security assessement scheme used for the se-
curity evaluation of the tamper resistant secure hardware
component is outside the scope of 3GPP specifications.
Sequence Number. The sequence number SQN is a 48-bit counter
(a 43-bits counter in some situations, see [TS 33.102, Sec. C.3.2]),
therefore guessable with a very low probability. We consider a
reasonable threat model where the value of SQN is unknown to the
attacker when the attack starts, but the attacker knows how it is
incremented during the attack. This corresponds to an attacker who
(i) can monitor the activity of targeted subscribers in its vicinity
during the attack but, (ii) cannot guess the initial value of SQN, (iii)
nor he can monitor targeted subscribers all the time (i.e., from the
very first use of the USIM up to the attack time).
[TS 33.102, Sec. 6.3.7] (3G) Sequence numbers (SQN) shall
have a length of 48 bits.
Other data. While not explicitly stated in the specification, we
shall assume that the private asymmetric key skHN is initially pri-
vate.
D.2 Security Requirements
We now extract and interpret from the 5G documents the security
goals the authentication method 5G-AKA should achieve according
to the 5G standard.
D.2.1 Authentication Properties. 5G specificationsmake semi-formal
claims about authentication properties at different places in the doc-
uments. We have identified relevant claims and translate them into
formal security goals, indicated in purple and cursive text . When
doing this, we rely on Lowe’s taxonomy of authentication proper-
ties [29]. The first benefit is that the Lowe’s taxonomy provides pre-
cise properties that are now well established and understood, which
can very often clarify an ambiguity [7]. The second benefit is that
there exists a formal relation between the Lowe’s taxononmy and
mathematical definitions of security properties that can be directly
modeled in Tamarin [1]. We give an overview of this taxonomy
and its relation with mathematical formulations in Appendix C.
Intuitively, it specifies, from an agent A’s point of view, four levels
of authentication between two agents A and B: (i) aliveness, which
only ensures that B has been running the protocol previously, but
not necessarily with A; (ii) weak agreement, which ensures that B
has previously been running the protocol with A, but not necessar-
ily with the same data; (iii) non-injective agreement, which ensures
that B has been running the protocol with A and both agree on the
data; and (iv) injective agreement, which additionally ensures that
for each run of the protocol of an agent there is a unique matching
run of the other agent, which prevents replay attacks.
We start by recalling the (informal) goals of authentication meth-
ods in 5G:
[TS 33.501, Sec. 6.1.1.1] The purpose of the primary authen-
tication and key agreement procedures is to enable mutual
authentication between the UE and the network and provide
keying material that can be used between the UE and net-
work in subsequent security procedures. The keying material
generated by the primary authentication and key agreement
procedure results in an anchor key called the KSEAF provided
by the AUSF of the home network to the SEAF of the serving
network.
As we shall see, 5G aims at providing stronger guarantees than
in older generations, e.g., than in 3G:
[TS 133.102, Sec. 5.1.2] (3G) The following security features
related to entity authentication are provided:
• user authentication: the property that the serving network
corroborates the user identity of the user;
• network authentication: the property that the user corrob-
orates that he is connected to a serving network that is
authorised by the user’s HE to provide him services; this
includes the guarantee that this authorisation is recent.
We now list the security goals in terms of authentication by
pairs of entities. Note that the specification considers some au-
thentication properties to be implicit. This means that the guaran-
tee is provided only after an additional key confirmation roundtrip
(w.r.t. KSEAF) between the subscribers and the SN . We discuss and
criticize this design choice in Section 5.
Authentication between subscribers andHNs. First, the subscribers
must have the assurance that authentication can only be successful
with SNs authorized by their HNs.
[TS 33.501, Sec. 5.1.2] Serving network authorization
by the home network: Assurance shall be provided to the
UE that it is connected to a serving network that is autho-
rized by the home network to provide services to the UE. This
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authorization is ‘implicit’ in the sense that it is implied by a
successful authentication and key agreement run.
[TS 33.501, Sec. 6.1.1.3] The binding to the serving network
prevents one serving network from claiming to be a different
serving network, and thus provides implicit serving network
authentication to the UE.
Formally, a subscriber must obtain non-injective agreement on
SNname with its HN after key confirmation.
In 5G, the trust assumptions are balanced differently than in
previous standards (e.g., 3G or 4G). Most notably, the level of trust
the system needs to put into SNs has been reduced. One important
property provided by 5G is that a SN can no longer fake authenti-
cation requests with the HNs for subscribers that are not attached
to one of its base station:
[TS 33.501, Sec. 6.1.4.1] Increased home control: The au-
thentication and key agreement protocols mandated to pro-
vide increased home control [compared to previous gen-
erations]. The feature of increased home control is use-
ful in preventing certain types of fraud, e.g. fraudulent
Nudm_UECM_Registration Request for registering the sub-
scriber’s serving AMF in UDM that are not actually present
in the visited network.
Formally, the HNs obtain aliveness of its subscribers at that SN,
which is non-injective agreement on SNname from the HNs’ point of
view with the subscribers.
Authentication between subscribers and SNs. As expected, the SNs
shall be able to authenticate the subscribers:
[TS 33.501, Sec. 5.1.2] Subscription authentication: The
serving network shall authenticate the Subscription Perma-
nent Identifier (SUPI) in the process of authentication and key
agreement between UE and network.
Formally, the SNs must obtain non-injective agreement on SUPI
with the subscribers, which is weak agreement from the SNs towards
subscribers (since the SUPI is the subscriber’s identifier).
Conversely, the subscribers shall be able to authenticate the SNs:
[TS 33.501, Sec. 5.1.2] Serving network authentication:
The UE shall authenticate the serving network identifier
through implicit key authentication.
NOTE 1: The meaning of ’implicit key authentication’ here
is that authentication is provided through the successful use
of keys resulting from authentication and key agreement in
subsequent procedures.
NOTE 2: The preceding requirement does not imply that
the UE authenticates a particular entity, e.g. an AMF, within
a serving network.
Formally, and because SNname is the SN ’s identifier, the sub-
scribers must obtain weak agreement with the SNs after key confir-
mation.
Authentication between SNs and HNs. The SNs shall be able to
authenticate the subscribers that are authorized by their corre-
sponding HN :
[TS 33.501, Sec. 5.1.2] UE authorization: The serving net-
work shall authorize the UE through the subscription profile
obtained from the home network. UE authorization is based
on the authenticated SUPI.
Formally, the SNs must obtain non-injective agreement on SUPI
with the HNs.
D.2.2 Confidentiality Properties. While it is not clearly specified,
it is obviously the case that 5G authentication methods should
achieve secrecy of KSEAF, K , and skHN. We recall similar goals for
3G:
[TS 133.102, Sec. 5.1.3] (3G) The following security features
are provided with respect to confidentiality of data on the
network access link:
• cipher algorithm agreement: the property that the MS and
the SN can securely negotiate the algorithm that they shall
use subsequently;
• cipher key agreement: the property that the MS and the SN
agree on a cipher key that they may use subsequently;
• confidentiality of user data: the property that user data
cannot be overheard on the radio access interface;
• confidentiality of signalling data: the property that sig-
nalling data cannot be overheard on the radio access inter-
face.
5G should ensure that knowing the KSEAF established in a cer-
tain session is insufficient to deduce a KSEAF key that has been
established in a previous session or that will be established in a
later session:
[TS 33.501, Sec. 3] backward security: The property that
for an entity with knowledge of Kn , it is computationally
infeasible to compute any previous Kn−m (m > 0) from which
Kn is derived.
NOTE 5: In the context of KgNB key derivation, backward
security refers to the property that, for a gNB with knowledge
of a KgNB, shared with a UE, it is computationally infeasible
to compute any previous KgNB that has been used between
the same UE and a previous gNB.
[TS 33.501, Sec. 3] forward security: The property that for
an entity with knowledge of Km that is used between that
entity and a second entity, it is computationally infeasible to
predict any future Km+n (n > 0) used between a third entity
and the second entity.
NOTE 6: In the context of KgNB key derivation, forward
security refers to the property that, for a gNB with knowledge
of a KgNB, shared with a UE, it is computationally infeasible
to predict any futureKgNB that will be used between the same
UE and another gNB.More specifically, n hop forward security
refers to the property that a gNB is unable to compute keys
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that will be used between a UE and another gNB to which the
UE is connected after n or more handovers (n = 1 or more).
Since we do not consider the full key hierarchy and how KgNB
can be derived from KSEAF, we shall consider those properties for
KSEAF directly. Formally, it should be the case thatKSEAF established
in a given session remains confidential even when the attacker learns
the KSEAF keys established in all other sessions. Note that this is
different from forward secrecy and post-compromise secrecy [16]
which fail to hold as we shall see in Section 5.1.
Note that some other confidentiality properties are considered
to be privacy properties (see Appendix D.2.3).
D.2.3 Privacy Properties. We first emphasize the importance given
to privacy in 5G:
[TR 33.899, Sec. 4.1,4.2] Subscription privacy deals with var-
ious aspects related to the protection of subscribers’ personal
information, e.g. identifiers, location, data, etc. [...] The se-
curity mechanisms defined in NextGen shall be able to be
configured to protect subscriber’s privacy.
[TR 33.899, Sec. 5.7.1] The subscription privacy is very im-
portant area for Next Generation system as can be seen by
the growing attention towards it, both inside and outside the
3GPP world.
Outside the 3GPP, an alliance of mobile network operators,
vendors, and universities called NGMN [9] has identified secu-
rity and privacy as an enabler and essential value proposition
of NextGen system and has presented that built-in privacy
should be included as a design principle [10]. Similarly, a 5G
PPP project called 5G-Ensure [11] has also identified privacy
as one of the topmost priorities for the NextGen system stat-
ing that the privacy has an important social impact [12]. [...]
[TS 33.501, Sec. F.2] EAP-AKA’ includes optional support
for identity privacy mechanism that protects the privacy
against passive eavesdropping.
This important role given to privacy can be explained by nu-
merous and critical attacks that have breached privacy (e.g., with
IMSI-catcher [36, 37]) in previous generations; see the survey [33].
We also recall that privacy was already a concern in 3G:
[TS 133.102, Sec. 5.1.1] (3G) The following security features
related to user identity confidentiality are provided:
• user identity confidentiality: the property that the per-
manent user identity (IMSI) of a user to whom a services is
delivered cannot be eavesdropped on the radio access link;
• user location confidentiality: the property that the pres-
ence or the arrival of a user in a certain area cannot be
determined by eavesdropping on the radio access link;
• user untraceability: the property that an intruder cannot
deduce whether different services are delivered to the same
user by eavesdropping on the radio access link.
Thus, already for 3G, user identity confidentiality, anonymity,
and untraceability were security requirements. However, those
properties were required against a passive attacker only (we discuss
and criticize this restriction to a passive attacker in Section 5). Note
that anonymity and untraceability (often called unlinkability) are
not clearly defined. We propose formalization in Section 4.3.
We now list more precise statements specifying how privacy
should be protected in 5G.
Confidentiality of SUPI. In 5G, the SUPI is considered sensitive
and must remain secret since it uniquely identifies users. Indeed,
an attacker who would be able to obtain this value from a sub-
scriber would be able to identify him, leading to classical user
location attacks (i.e., see [TS1˙33.102, Sec. 5.1.1] above), much like
IMSI-catcher attacks.
[TS 33.501, Sec. 5.2.5] The SUPI should not be transferred in
clear text over 5G RAN except routing information, e.g. Mobile
Country Code (MCC) and Mobile Network Code (MNC).
[TS 33.501, Sec. 6.12] Subscription identifier privacy: In
the 5G system, the globally unique 5G subscription permanent
identifier is called SUPI as defined in 3GPP TS 23.501 [2].
The SUCI is a privacy preserving identifier containing the
concealed SUPI. [...]
[TS 133.102, Sec. 5.1.1] (3G)User identity confidentiality
(see above).
Formally, the SUPI shall remain secret in the presence of a passive
attacker .
Confidentiality of SQN. For similar reasons, SQN must remain
secret. An additional reason that is not explicitly stated is that SQN
leaks the number of successful authentications the corresponding
USIM has performed since it was manufactured, which is strongly
correlated to its age and activity. This is even more critical when
the attacker learns SQN at different times.
[TS 33.102, Sec. 6.2.3] (3G) Here, AK is an anonymity key
used to conceal the sequence number as the latter may expose
the identity and location of the user. The concealment of the
sequence number is to protect against passive attacks only. If
no concealment is needed then f5 ≡ 0 (AK = 0).
[TS 133.102, Sec. C.3.2] (3G)User anonymity: the value of
SQN may allow to trace the user over longer periods. If this
is a concern then SQN has to be concealed by an anonymity
key as specified in section 6.3.
Formally, the SQN shall remain secret in the presence of a passive
attacker .
Anonymity and Untraceability. Preventing the attacker from
learning pieces of data that are identifying (e.g., SUPI, SQN) is insuffi-
cient to protect against traceability attacks, user location attacks, or
even anonymity attacks (we explain why and discuss definitions in
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Section 4.3). While no formal statement is made on the necessity of
ensuring untraceability or anonymity for 5G, the following excerpts
and the fact that it was required for 3G ([TS1˙33.102, Sec. 5.1.1], see
above), seem to imply that those properties are relevant for 5G as
well.
On untraceability (also called unlinkability): [TS 133.102, Sec. 5.1.1],
item 2 and:
[TS 33.501, Sec. C.2] The reason for mentioning the non-
freshness is that, normally, in order to attain unlinkability
(i.e., to make it infeasible for over-the-air attacker to link
SUCIs together), it is necessary for newly generated SUCIs to
be fresh. But, in case of the null-scheme, the SUCI does not
conceal the SUPI. So unlinkability is irrelevant.
[TR 33.899, Sec. 5.2.3.8.2] Security threats: Over-use of a
single UE key-pair may harm user privacy (allowing a user’s
actions to be linked and tracked across multiple domains and
services).
On anonymity: [TS 133.102, Sec. 5.1.1], item 3 and:
[33.849, Sec. 6.4.2] (TR on Privacy in 3GPP, 2016) The UMTS
authentication procedure (TS 33.102 [10]) design is an example
of how to fulfil anonymity:
(1) Analysis of the authentication process: identity and location
of the user may be exposed.
(2) Identify an identifying attribute: sequence number may
bring a risk of personal identification.
(3) Risk: The sequence number may expose the identity
and thus the location of the user.
(4) Anonymizing technique used: use Anonymity Key in the
Authentication Token to conceal (blind) the sequence num-
ber.
[TR 33.899, Sec. 5.1.4.14.3] If there was no single NAS se-
curity termination then the unencrypted part of a signalling
message would have to contain parameters that would allow
routing to the correct NAS entity, e.g. SM entity in a network
slice. This information about the slice may give away infor-
mation on the services used. However, user identity privacy
should prevent that an eavesdropper can associate a particular
signalling message with a particular subscriber. Editor’s Note:
The above paragraph has been included for completeness. It is
ffs whether leaving parameters unencrypted that are required
for NAS-internal routing would endanger privacy.
Formally, it seems that 5G authentication methods are required
to provide anonymity and untraceability of the subscribers in the
presence of a passive attacker .
D.2.4 Other Properties. As specified below, the established keys
should never be the same twice:
[TS 133.102, Sec. 6.2.3] (3G) Key reuse: A wrap around of
the counter SQN could lead to a repeated use of a key pair
(CK, IK). This repeated key use could potentially be exploited
by an attacker to compromise encryption or forge message au-
thentication codes applied to data sent over the 3GPP-defined
air interfaces.
This will be analyzed as part of Injective agreement properties
on the established key KSEAF for different pairs of parties.
Finally, 5G specify some security goals in the context of back-
ward compatibility with older generations. We do not analyze those
properties as they would require us to analyze the combination of
the 5G authentication protocols with the older generations authen-
tication protocols. This is left as future work.
[TS 33.501, Sec. 6.1.1.3] Key separation: Furthermore, the
anchor key provided to the serving network shall also be spe-
cific to the authentication having taken place between the
UE and a 5G core network, i.e. the KSEAF shall be crypto-
graphically separate from the key KASME delivered from
the home network to the serving network in earlier mobile
network generations.
[TS 33.501, Sec. 5.11] An attacker could attempt a bidding
down attack by making the UE and the network entities
respectively believe that the other side does not support a
security feature, even when both sides in fact support that
security feature. It shall be ensured that a bidding down attack,
in the above sense, can be prevented.
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